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Estimating Corporate Yield Curves 
Recently arbitrage free models have been proposed by Das and Sundaram (2000) Jarrow, 
Lando and Turnbull (1997) and Das and Tufano (1996), among others for pricing credit 
derivatives. These models require sovereign and corporate yield curve estimates as input. 
These yield curves are required since these credit risky models are calibrated first to a 
sovereign and then to at least one other estimate of a zero coupon corporate yield curve. This 
sequential calibration insures that credit derivative prices obtained from the calibrated model 
are consistent with the price of the instruments that underlie the credit derivative. Hence 
prices obtained by the credit risk model depends upon the accuracy of the sovereign and 
corporate yield curves. 
 
We find that corporate yield curve estimates are less accurate than Treasury yield curve 
estimates. This implies that arbitrage free models of credit risk may well yield credit 
derivative prices that are less accurate than the credit risk free derivative prices estimated by 
arbitrage free models not subject to credit risk. We also find that even with careful data 
selection, significant liquidity and tax induced errors remain in Treasury and corporate yield 
curve estimates. However we find that the size of the errors from these sources are modest. 
We conclude that there is no pressing need to adjust existing yield curve models, but one 
should be aware that the quality of corporate yield curve estimates are poorer than Treasury 
yield curve estimates. Finally, we find that pooling corporate bond data by broad rating 
category does not adversely impact the quality of the resulting corporate yield curve estimate. 
This is good news since pooling data by broad rating category increases sample size and 
allows for more accurate estimates of corporate yield curves. 
 
Our results are consistent with Elton, Gruber, Agrawal and Mann (2001) who suggest that 
corporate yield curve estimates are less reliable than Treasury yield curve estimates. Unlike 
Elton et al. (2001) we study three common statistical yield curve models rather than just one 
and test to see if corporate yield curves are less reliable than Treasury yield curves. 
Furthermore, we attempt to determine whether a minor modification of these models can 
resolve the problem of relatively inaccurate corporate yield curves. While we were unable to 
do so, at least we are able to recommend that more accurate corporate yield curves can be 
obtained by pooling bonds by broad rating category. 
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We measure errors produced by these yield curve models by appealing directly to arbitrage 
free theory. Any estimate of a yield curve implies an estimate of a zero coupon discount 
function. In theory, this discount function should replicate the market price of coupon bonds 
exactly. If not, then this implies that the coupon bond, being composed of a portfolio of zeros, 
is worth less (more) than the addition of values of component zeros. Market participants 
should then buy (sell) the undervalued (overvalued) coupon bond and sell (buy) the portfolio 
of zeros by (reverse) coupon striping the coupon bond. 
 
Therefore we first estimate the zero coupon discount function that is used to estimate the yield 
curve. We then price a given coupon bond using this discount function and find the 
corresponding yield. We take the difference between the quoted market yield and the yield of 
the coupon bond as found by our estimated discount function. We measure this difference for 
all bonds in our sample and call them errors. We first test to determine whether applying 
common statistical yield curve models to estimate corporate yield curves produce 
significantly larger errors than applying them to estimate Treasury yield curves. Then we 
study the structure of errors produced by standard econometric models of the corporate and 
sovereign term structure to see whether it is possible that enhanced yield curve models may 
result in improved yield curve estimates. 
1. Alternative Yield Curve Models 
We first select candidate yield curve models to see whether they can accurately estimate 
corporate yield curves. We chose McCulloch (1975) since Beim (1992) finds that cubic 
splines perform as well or better than other techniques and cubic spline methods are popular. 
We choose Vasicek and Fong (1992) since they suggest their model can obtain improvements 
in the cubic spline methodology. Finally we chose Nelson and Siegel (1987) since maybe a 
parsimonious model can do as well a job as more complex models. 
 
Specifically, McCulloch (1975) uses cubic splines and Vasicek and Fong (1982) use 
exponential splines to fit a discount function from which the term structure is derived. 
Vasicek and Fong (1982) point out that cubic splines can lead to unrealistic shapes for the 
forward curve. They recommend an exponential spline method for estimating the discount 
function, as an exponential spline obtains a desirable asymptotically flat forward curve. To 
highlight the difference between these two models, we write the McCulloch (1975) and 
Vasicek and Fong (1982) discount functions below. 
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Equation (1) is McCulloch’s discount function fit by estimating the parameters aj by 
regression methods and ƒj are the cubic spline basis functions each of which are joined 
together at k knot points. These knot points joint together estimates of the discount function at 
different maturity ranges and allow for flexibility in capturing different shapes of the yield 
curve. Equation (2) is Vasicek and Fong’s discount function where parameters aj and b are 
estimated by regression methods and again ƒj and k are the basis functions and knot points 
respectively.  The key difference between (1) and (2) is that Vasicek and Fong (1982) 
transform an augment of the discount function to obtain an exponential form. 
 
However the above approaches exhibit some shortcomings at the long end of the yield curve 
so Nelson and Siegel (1987) developed a parsimonious model to estimate a yield curve that 
has superior properties at the long end. To highlight the differences between this approach 
and the spline approach, we write the Nelson and Siegel (1987) model below. 
 
Equation (3) is Nelson and Siegel’s forward curve from which the spot curve is derived by 
integrating (3) over the term to maturity t.  The parameters B0, B1, B2 and t1 are estimated by 
regression methods. The discount function implied by the spot curve is simply 
 
where r is the spot yield. In other words, rather than fitting the yield curve from an estimate of 
a discount function, this approach suggests a functional form for the forward curve from 
which the spot yield curve and the discount function can be derived. Since the entire yield 
curve is estimated in one step, there is no need to consider the location and number of knot 
points, although the model is much less flexible. The latter can be an important disadvantage 
when the actual yield curve takes on unusual shapes. 
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2. Data Selection 
The next step is to choose our sample. We use the University of Houston’s Fixed Income 
Database. This data base consists of monthly information on most publicly traded bonds since 
1973. Each issue is identified by cusip number and includes information on issue date, 
maturity date, flat price (noted as quote or matrix based), coupon, accrued interest, bond 
rating, industry sector, call and put features. As the latest update we have runs to March 1997, 
we use monthly data that runs from January 1988 to March 1997, 111 months in all. 
Initially we select all Treasury and AA financial bonds. We chose to estimate an AA yield 
curve because we are confident that the Fixed Income Data Base contains a large pool of AA 
rated straight (no optionality) bonds with quoted prices.
i We make no distinction between 
bonds rated at the higher (AA+) or lower (AA-) end of the AA range. Later we add a proxy 
variable to see if errors are related to shades in the AA grade. We chose only financial 
industry bonds since we wish to construct a credit risky yield curve that has comparable credit 
risk all along the yield curve. Hickman (1958) notes that in general we cannot expect that, say 
an AA utility bond has the same credit risk as say an AA financial so we at least assure 
ourselves that our yield curve is constructed from bonds in the same industry. Since the 
financial industry is most directly involved in credit derivatives, we though this would be the 
most interesting yield curve to use. We chose Treasury and AA financial bonds that have 
maturities of up to ten years because we find like Elton and Green (1998) that beyond ten 
years, the lack of on the run Treasury bonds between ten and thirty years to maturity created a 
liquidity problem. 
 
We then apply empirical criteria to avoid unnecessary problems. Matrix priced bonds are 
eliminated since Sarig and Warga (1989) and Warga (1991) find that use of matrix 
determined prices are liable to lead to serious errors. We double-check the remaining sample 
by eliminating all bonds that are not included in one of the database’s indexes. Since the 
origin of this data is from Lehman Brothers we believe that bond traders will be more careful 
in pricing benchmark bonds that are included in an index.
ii All bonds with call or put features 
are discarded since these bonds are liable to be less liquid and introducing an optionally term 
in later yield curve models introduces an easily avoided source of error. Knowing the flat 
price, accrued interest, coupon and maturity and day count conventions, we replicate the 
quoted yield in every single instance for the remaining bonds in our sample. In this way we 
make sure there are no errors in our sample. 
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We now apply McCulloch (1975), Vasicek and Fong (1982) and Nelson and Siegel (1987) on 
this data to estimate the Treasury and AA financial zero coupon yield curves on a monthly 
basis from January 1988 to March 1997. For McCulloch (1975) we select knot points 
according to his recommendations. The number of knot points equals the square root of that 
month’s sample size rounded down to the nearest whole number. The knots are located evenly 
so that there are an equal number of observations between each knot point. This means we use 
between six and nine knot points for the Treasury sample, and between two and seven for the 
AA financial bond sample.
iii Vasicek and Fong (1982) present no recommendations 
concerning the location and number of knot points, and applying McCulloch’s (1975) 
procedures does lead to convergence problems so we cannot make the two models exactly 
comparable.
iv We choose three knot points, one located at each end of the maturity spectrum 
and another located at that maturity than minimises squared error.
v 
 
Additionally we follow normal practise and make no attempt to fit all the data to these yield 
curves. Standard practice (See Vasicek and Fong, 1982) is to make an initial estimate of the 
yield curve, and then drop data whose residuals are far away from the estimated yield curve. 
This procedure is repeated until no more extreme outliers are present. The end result is that 
we use 9,718 Treasury and 4,798 AA financial bond prices in our final estimates of the yield 
curves. Finally we include a tax adjustment for McCulloch (1975) and Vasicek and Fong 
(1982), but not for Nelson and Siegel (1987). One reason why we chose the Nelson and 
Siegel (1982) model is that we wish to see whether it is worthwhile incorporating tax 
adjustments that maybe misspecified. 
 
McCulloch (1975), Vasicek and Fong (1982) and Nelson and Siegel (1982) provide an 
estimate of the zero coupon discount function. We then price a given bond using the 
candidate discount function and calculate its implied yield. We call this yield the theoretical 
yield. We then take the difference between the quoted yield and the theoretical yield and call 
the resulting difference error. 
 
In total we obtain 9,718 and 4,798 errors for Treasury and AA rated financial bonds 
respectively for each of the three statistical yield curve models that we examine. The 
statistical properties of this data are reported in Table I. 
 
As is typical of financial data, the distribution of the errors is characterised by positive 
kurtosis. Some small amount of skewness is evident in the sample. The errors typically Discussion Papers in Finance: 2001-01 
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average out to one basis point or less, but the maximum and minimum errors are very large, 
ranging from about  –400 basis points to about 275 basis points. The sample standard 
deviation reflects this variability and is about two or three times larger for AA financial errors 
than for Treasury errors.  For example, Table I shows that for McCulloch (1975) a one 
standard deviation in the Treasury errors is only about 11 basis points, but for AA financials, 
it is about 30 basis points. 
 
3. Corporate versus Treasury Errors 
We recognise that each statistical yield curve model produces an error that should be 
minimised according to the arbitrage free criteria. This suggests that the smaller the error the 
better the performance of the statistical yield curve model. Similarly a smaller error variance 
implies that the discount function underlying each model is more reliable. That is, a low 
variance indicates that the discount function is more consistent in replicating coupon bond 
prices than a discount function that has a higher variance. This leads us to use the standard t-
test of differences in the means and the F-test for differences in the error variance to 
determine which yield curve model best fits the data set. 
 
Table 2 reports the standard t and F-tests of differences in the mean and variance of the errors 
that occur when a given statistical yield curve model is first applied to estimate a Treasury 
yield curve, and then again to estimate a AA financial yield curve. We find that the error 
means are no larger when estimating AA financial than when estimating Treasury yield 
curves. However, this only implies that we can expect accurate corporate yield curves and 
therefore accurate credit derivative prices “on average”, which is cold comfort when one is 
trying to price credit derivatives in specific instances. Most importantly, we observe a 
statistically significant deterioration in the reliability of all discount functions as the variance 
of the AA financial yield curve errors is significantly larger that their Treasury yield curve 
counterparts. This suggests that applying common statistical yield curve models to estimate a 
corporate rather than a Treasury yield curve obtains less accurate corporate yield curves than 
Treasury yield curves. In turn this implies that credit derivative prices may be less accurate 
than credit risk free derivative prices since the former are obtained from arbitrage free models 
that are calibrated to less accurate corporate yield curves. Discussion Papers in Finance: 2001-01 
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4. Explaining the Errors 
We suspect that AA financial yield curves are less accurate than Treasury yield curves 
because corporate bonds maybe less liquid and may have larger tax biases than Treasury 
bonds. We now intend to regress proxies of liquidity and tax effects on our error series in an 
attempt to see whether more accurate yield curves can result from yield curve models that 
adjust for these factors. However, a complicating factor is that there are two sources of 
liquidity error, priced liquidity error and stale price liquidity error. 
 
These two types of liquidity errors occur because bond traders offer only indicator quotes on 
the OTC market. This happens since the latest developments may require bond traders to 
revise the quote from the time it is posted to the time that a counterparty expresses interest. 
Actively traded bonds tend to have more accurate indicator quotes as bond traders wish to 
attract business. Less actively traded bonds would have less accurate quotes since there is less 
business to attract and there is no penalty for giving inaccurate quotes because they can be 
revised. As a result less actively traded bonds tend to have quotes that are inaccurate, being 
either too high or too low relative to the current yield curve. We call this source of liquidity 
error stale price liquidity error. In contrast, priced liquidity errors arise from current quotes 
that reflect the bond’s lack of liquidity. As a result, its’ price is depressed and its yield is high 
relative to more liquid bonds. 
 
Priced liquidity errors are not a serious problem for estimating the yield curve. Using bond 
prices that reflect priced liquidity obtains yield curves that simply reflect market conditions. 
This yield curve will be a good benchmark, as bonds with average liquidity should lie on the 
yield curve whereas bonds with more (less) liquidity should lie below (above) the yield curve. 
In contrast, stale price liquidity errors are a serious problem since if one uses stale prices the 
resulting yield curve estimate will reflect unknown errors. We take the absolute value of our 
error (hereafter AVE) as our dependent variable in later regressions because the dependent 
variable constructed in this way can distinguish between these two types of liquidity errors. 
 
To illustrate how the absolute value of the error (AVE) can distinguish between these two 
types of errors, consider issue size, a common proxy for liquidity. The idea is that the larger 
the issue size, the larger is liquidity as there are more bonds to trade. Therefore relatively 
small issues may have priced liquidity errors since the bond is not very liquid or it may have Discussion Papers in Finance: 2001-01 
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stale price liquidity errors since the bond trader quoting the yield may not consider it 
worthwhile to keep up to date on developments concerning the bond. 
 
If we measure the error as the absolute size of the difference between quoted and theoretical 
yields, then this variable will be unrelated to priced liquidity errors, but will be inversely 
related to stale price liquidity errors. For priced liquidity errors, a large negative error may 
result from a bond with greater average size (liquidity) and a large positive error may result 
from a bond with lower average size (liquidity). By taking the absolute value of the error, 
priced liquidity errors should therefore be unrelated to issue size since large absolute values 
will be associated with both large and small issues. However, for stale price liquidity errors, 
larger absolute value errors will result from a small bond being quoted at yields that are either 
too high or too low and smaller absolute value liquidity errors will result from a large bond 
that is priced more accurately. This means that as issue size increases AVE and therefore stale 
price liquidity error decrease. 
 
As proxies for stale price liquidity errors, we chose two proxies that are specific to the bond, 
issue size and relative age of the bond and two that are related to general market conditions, 
consumer confidence and market volume. We use the latter to see if general market 
conditions have a differential impact on the Treasury and corporate bond market. We also 
include a credit rating proxy for refinements in the AA rating to see if AVE is related to 
shades in credit quality. For tax error proxies, we chose the dollar amount of the discount or 
premium implied by the price quote. 
 
As explained above, issue size (SIZE) should be inversely related to stale price induced AVE. 
We also suspect that the incidence of stale price errors will increase with age of the bond. 
Newly issued bonds tend to actively trade making it worthwhile for the bond trader to keep 
abreast of the latest developments, but as the bond seasons, less trades tend to occur. With 
fewer trades there is less trading income so the incentive to keep abreast of the latest 
developments weakens. Therefore we expect a positive relationship between age and AVE. 
Since our sample includes bonds of all sorts of scheduled maturity, our age variable 
(RELATIVE AGE) is the present age divided by original maturity. For example, an original 
ten-year bond two years later has a relative age of 0.2, and three years later 0.3.  As the 
relative age variable increases, age increases so relative age should be directly related to 
AVE. 
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We obtain information about market volume and consumer confidence from Datastream. 
Since only information on equity market volume is available, we chose the monthly dollar 
volume of equity trades, measured in billions, as our proxy for general market activity. We 
suspect that trading volumes in the bond and equity markets are positively related so as equity 
market dollar volume (VOL) increases, liquidity in the bond market improves and the size of 
the AVE decrease. Hence we expect that as VOL increases, AVE decrease. 
 
Our proxy for consumer confidence (CONFIDENCE) is the Conference Board’s monthly 
consumer confidence index. As this index increases, consumer confidence increases, so we 
expect to see rising liquidity and smaller AVE for AA financial bond yields. However there 
may be a flight to quality phenomena for Treasury bonds since our sample contains the last 
recession and several bearish markets.  It is possible that during bearish periods, bond 
investors avoid corporate bonds and purchase Treasury bonds instead in an attempt to find 
safety. If so, we may observe a positive rather than a negative relation between AVE and 
consumer confidence for Treasury bonds. That is, as consumer confidence decreases, 
investors buy more Treasuries in order to find safety so stale price errors for Treasuries 
decrease. 
 
A tax timing option is another kind of tax effect typically not modelled in any statistical yield 
curve model so we include a proxy for tax timing options. Investors can chose when to realise 
capital gains or losses to minimise overall tax liability. Our proxy is the dollar amount of the 
premium if the bond is priced above par (PREMIUM), zero otherwise, and the dollar amount 
of the discount if the bond is priced below par (DISCOUNT), zero otherwise. By using these 
proxies we are able to jointly test whether there are any significant tax timing effects and/or 
capital gains effects remaining in the AVE. 
 
We expect insignificant tax timing coefficients if the model adjust for tax effects accurately. 
If not, we expect significant tax coefficients, but we are unable to suggest which sign we 
should anticipate. The DISCOUNT and PREMIUM coefficients may be negative since tax-
timing options are valuable. This may encourage trading and so reduce stale price errors. 
Alternatively, Elton and Green (1998) suggest that both high and low coupon bonds are 
undesirable for trustees. As trusts are permitted to pay out only the coupon income, purchase 
of high coupon bonds imply favouring current beneficiaries, whereas purchasing low coupons 
imply favouring future beneficiaries. To avoid accusations, trustees may avoid high and low 
coupon bonds. This would lead to lower trading volumes and more frequent instances of stale Discussion Papers in Finance: 2001-01 
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price liquidity errors for high and low coupon bonds. Hence the DISCOUNT and PREMIUM 
coefficients may be positive since a large portion of bond investors find high and low coupon 
bonds undesirable. 
 
Finally we include a variable to capture any differences caused by shades in credit quality 
within the broad AA rating class. We suspect that liquidity may decline as credit rating 
decreases and we wonder whether this effect can be seen within shades of credit ratings. The 
idea is that the poorer the credit quality, the more an investor needs to study the prospects of 
the underling issuer. As this search is costly, we expect that the lower the rating the fewer the 
trades and the larger are stale price liquidity errors. Our rating proxy (RATING) is a dummy 
style variable that equals 2 for an AA+ rating, 1 for an AA rating and 0 for an AA- ratings. 
Therefore as the rating increases, we expect the AVE to decrease. 
 
In summary we estimate the following regression to explain the absolute value of the errors. 
 
hit = a + b1 SIZEit  + b2 RELATIVE AGEit  + b3 CONFIDENCEit + b4 VOLit 
+ b5 DISCOUNTit + b6 PREMIUMit + b7 RATINGit + eit                    (4) 
 
Note that hit is the AVE estimated from the candidate statistical yield curve model for bond i 
at time t for the sample at hand. 
 
If there are significant liquidity errors then we expect significant negative coefficients for 
SIZE and VOL and significant positive coefficients for RELATIVE AGE. We expect a 
negative coefficient for CONFIDENCE in the AA financial regressions but we may obtain a 
negative or positive (in the case of a flight to quality phenomena) coefficient in the Treasury 
regression. We are unable to suggest which sign we should expect for DISCOUNT and 
PREMIUM. Finally we expect a negative RATING coefficient for the AA financial bond 
sample. 
 
5. Regression Results 
The AVE data is a pooled time and cross sectional series. It is well known that such data 
typically has autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. Consequently we apply Newey and West 
(1987) to estimate an autocorrelated and heteroscedasticity consistent estimate of (4). The 
results obtained by this regression for the Treasury and AA financial bond sample is reported Discussion Papers in Finance: 2001-01 
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in Tables 3 and 4 respectively. Both tables’ report that all regressions are significant and have 
considerable adjusted R
2 of between 30 and 50%. 
 
Issue specific liquidity proxies provide evidence that stale priced liquidity errors remain in the 
AVE. RELATIVE AGE is always of the correct sign and significant at least at the 5% level. 
On the other hand, SIZE is never statistically significant and is often the wrong sign. 
However, recall that we chose our sample by including only bonds that were included in one 
of the Lehman Brothers indexes. One of the criteria for inclusion in an index is issue size, as 
they too are concerned about inaccurate prices caused by a lack of liquidity and use issue size 
to reduce the problem
vi. Apparently the Lehman Brothers size criteria is effective in 
eliminating the size-induced stale price problem. 
 
The market level liquidity proxies also provide evidence that liquidity induced errors remain 
in the AVE. For Treasury securities, CONFIDENCE is statistically significant for two of the 
three models, but for AA financials, the proxy is never significant. For AA financials, VOL is 
significant for all three of the models, but for Treasury securities, it is never significant. 
Taken together, these market level proxies suggest that Treasury bonds experience “flight to 
quality” market conditions, while the demand for AA financials is associated with the trading 
volume in equities. 
 
Meanwhile tax induced errors are evident in all regressions. The tax coefficients are always 
negative indicating that tax timing options are valuable to bond investors and that fiduciary 
concerns of trustees does not have a significant impact on bond prices. The DISCOUNT 
proxy is significant in all but one case, but the PREMIUM proxy is significant only three 
times. 
 
Finally, Table 4 reports that the rating variable is usually of the expected sign, but is never 
significant. This suggests that while lower rated bonds may have greater error, the difference 
in error is not significant within broad rating classes. This is good news since it suggests that 
there is nothing wrong with pooling AA financial bonds by broad credit rating class. This 
suggests that we can increase sample size by pooling bonds of the same broad rating class 
thus increasing sample size and improving the reliability of estimates of corporate yield 
curves. 
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So far, we have presented evidence that common methods of estimating yield curves have 
stale priced liquidity and tax-induced biases. But how serious are these problems? The 
relative importance of the proxies is measured by the beta coefficients reported in Table 5. 
These beta coefficients are standardised regression coefficients found by performing the same 
regression as before, only the regression is performed on the variables normalised by 
subtracting the means and dividing by its variance. They can be interpreted as the standard 
deviation change in the AVE in response to a one standard deviation change in the 
independent variable. 
 
Table 5 reports that most proxy betas are quite small and so are the associated basis point 
responses in AVE to a one standard deviation change in the independent variables. However, 
the RELATIVE AGE beta is much larger than all the rest, and is an order of magnitude larger 
for the AA financial yield curve than for the Treasury yield curve. For example, the Vasicek 
and Fong (1982) AA financial RELATIVE AGE beta is 0.07, which means that for a one 
standard deviation change in the RELATIVE AGE variable, we have a 0.07 standard 
deviation change (or about two basis points) in AVE.  This suggests that the size of liquidity 
and tax-induced errors is modest, so adjusting statistical yield curve models for these 
problems would not likely achieve important improvements in accuracy. 
 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
We conduct empirical tests to show that we can expect less reliable corporate yield curve 
estimates than Treasury yield curve estimates. We then examine the errors produced by 
common statistical yield curve models in an attempt to see whether it is worth our while to 
improve statistical yield curve modelling. We find that even with careful data selection, 
significant liquidity and tax-induced errors remain. However, we find that the size of liquidity 
and tax-induced errors is modest, so adjusting statistical yield curve models for these 
problems would not likely yield important improvements in accuracy. 
 
Evidently something more than stale priced liquidity and tax effects are causing the extra 
variability in AA financial errors, and we can offer no simple solution to this problem. This 
implies that arbitrage free models may well yield less accurate prices for credit derivatives 
than derivatives that are not subject to credit risk. However our findings are not so bleak. We 
do find that pooling financial bonds by the broad AA credit rating does not lead to significant 
additional error. This is good news since it implies that corporate bond yield curves can be Discussion Papers in Finance: 2001-01 
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estimated from bonds pooled by broad credit rating thus increasing sample size and accuracy 
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Table 1 
This table reports the summary statistics of spread errors calculated as the difference between the 
quoted yield and the yield implied by the McCulloch, Vasicek and Fong and Nelson and Siegel 
discount functions. There are 9,718 and 4,798 observations of Treasury and AA Financial spread errors 
respectively. All numbers are in percent. 
 
 
Treasury  AA Financial 








Mean  0.000193  2.87E-05  0.007895  0.001069  0.004741  0.011393 
Median  0.000151  -0.000449  0.002275  0.007208  0.044205  0.058889 
Maximum  2.551083  2.748966  2.732368  1.982045  2.498619  2.482293 
Minimum  -2.157151  -2.650089  -2.681900  -2.327525  -3.287361  -3.985353 
Std. Dev.  0.107674  0.116539  0.135024  0.305369  0.354265  0.402203 
Skewness  -1.943330  -2.653998  -1.606571  -0.369566  -2.349089  -2.953887 




This table reports tests that compares the differences in the means and variances of apparent arbitrage 
opportunities produced by applying the same statistical yield curve model to AA financial and Treasury 
bond prices. The observations are obtained by subtracting the quoted yield of each individual bond 
with its yield derived by the discount function of the candidate statistical yield curve model. The 
sample size is 9,718 for Treasury and 4,798 for AA financial bonds. 
 
AA Financial vs. 
Treasury 
t-test statistic of  the spread 
error mean 
F-Test of the spread 
error variance 
Vasicek and Fong  0.8977  9.2409
* 
McCulloch  0.1929  8.0432
* 
Nelson and Siegel  0.5863  8.8730
* 
*Significant at the 1% level. 1-% critical value for the F-statistic is 1.19. The degrees of freedom for the 
F-statistic are 4,798 for the numerator and 9,718 for the denominator. 
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Table 3 
This table reports the results of a combined cross sectional and time series regression of proxies for 
stale price liquidity errors and tax effects on the absolute value of the difference between the quoted 
yield and the theoretical yield for Treasury bonds. The theoretical yield is derived from the zero coupon 
discount function obtained by common statistical yield curve models.  There are 9,718 observations 
from the January 1988 to March 1997 time period. 
 
Treasury 
Vasicek and Fong  McCulloch  Nelson and Siegel 
Variable 
Parameter  T-Statistic  Parameter  T-Statistic  Parameter  T-Statistic 
Constant  -0.024448  -0.604617  -0.016874  -0.464242  -0.119772
*  -2.910366 
Issue Size (-)  -0.002178  -0.078077  0.007545  0.306106  0.016810  0.546495 
Relative Age (+)  0.052902
+  2.191789  0.070454
*  3.174723  0.066120
*  2.530987 
Confidence (+/-)  0.000771
+  2.434736  0.000591
+  2.330777  0.000306  0.948076 
Market Vol. (-)  -0.000771  -0.188985  -0.000448  -0.124800  0.006665  1.430709 
Discount (+/-)  -0.004225
*  -3.589397  -0.001630  -1.497529  -0.005704
*  -4.466532 
Premium (+/-)  -0.000606  -1.160532  -0.001145
+  -2.026250  -0.001643
*  -2.605315 
R
2 (ADJ)  0.394189  N/A  0.385877  N/A  0.353589  N/A 
D-W Stat.  2.046725  N/A  2.026826  N/A  2.090722  N/A 
F-Statistic  487.3075  N/A  470.6109  N/A  409.8217  N/A 
*Significant at the 1% level, 
+ significant at the 5% level 
x Significant at the 10% level 
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Table 4 
This table reports the results of a combined cross sectional and time series regression of proxies for 
stale price liquidity errors and tax effects on the absolute value of the difference between the quoted 
yield and the theoretical yield for AA rated financial bonds. The theoretical yield is derived from the 
zero coupon discount function obtained by common statistical yield curve models.  There are 4,798 
observations from the January 1988 to March 1997 time period. 
 
AA Financial  Vasicek and Fong  McCulloch  Nelson and Siegel 
Variable 
Parameter  T-Statistic  Parameter  T-Statistic  Parameter  T-Statistic 
Constant  0.043684  0.616868  0.075581  1.615548  0.028302  0.423329 
Issue Size (-)  0.001626  0.026080  -0.027542  -0.989619  0.015168  0.206770 
Relative Age (+)  0.310313
*  4.431125  0.438583
*  9.166549  0.501332
*  4.977677 
Confidence (-)  0.000552  1.197258  0.000149  0.428965  -0.000367  -0.606617 
Market Vol. (-)  -0.035142
*  -3.550516  -0.026923
*  -4.136384  -0.021061
x  -1.684445
 
Discount  (+/-)  -0.012110
*  -3.935919  -0.004547
+  -2.110845  -0.012312
*  -3.469957 
Premium  (+/-)  -0.001644  -0.498413  -0.003888
x  -1.707578  -0.000425  -0.086737 
Rating (-)  -0.007826  -0.212077  0.000137  0.006410  -0.012898  -0.255272 
R
2 (ADJ)  0.369572  N/A  0.294145  N/A  0.509669  N/A 
D-W Stat.  2.153375  N/A  1.974768  N/A  2.174670  N/A 
F-Statistic  188.4352  N/A  134.2398  N/A  333.3438  N/A 
*Significant at the 1% level, 
+ significant at the 5% level 
x Significant at the 10% level 
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Table 5 
This table reports the beta coefficients of the regressions reported in Tables 3 and 4 and the basis point 
impact on the dependent variable of a one standard deviation change in the independent variable. 
 
Vasicek and Fong  McCulloch  Nelson and Siegel 
Treasury 
Beta  Basis 
Point 
Beta  Basis 
Point 
Beta  Basis 
Point 
Issue Size  -0.00055  -0.006  0.00363  0.036  0.00418  0.052 
Relative Age  0.01159  0.128  0.01321  0.132  0.01397  0.173 
Confidence  0.00000  0.000  0.00000  0.000  0.00000  0.000 
Market Vol.  -0.00003  0.000  -0.00007  -0.001  0.00025  0.003 
Discount  -0.00005  0.000  -0.00002  0.000  -0.00006  -0.001 
Premium  0.00000  0.000  -0.00001  0.000  -0.00001  0.000 
Vasicek and Fong  McCulloch  Nelson and Siegel  AA Financial 
Beta  Basis 
Point 
Beta  Basis 
Point 
Beta  Basis 
Point 
Issue Size  0.00034  0.010  -0.00342  -0.077  0.00327  0.111 
Relative Age  0.07373  2.173  0.09352  2.098  0.14829  5.049 
Confidence  0.00000  0.000  0.00000  0.000  0.00000  0.000 
Market Vol.  -0.00118  -0.035  -0.00078  -0.018  -0.00077  -0.026 
Discount  -0.00013  -0.004  -0.00004  -0.001  -0.00013  -0.004 
Premium  -0.00002  -0.001  -0.00004  -0.001  -0.00001  0.000 
Rating  -0.00098  -0.029  0.00001  0.000  -0.00191  -0.065 
 
 
                                                         
i We rejected industrial bonds since this category is very heterogeneous where both USX (formerly US 
Steel) and Disney are both classified as “industrial”. We looked at subcategories of industrial bonds 
and found that the sample size was much smaller than financial bonds. 
ii We thank Arthur Warga, who heads up the University of Houston’s Fixed Income Database 
programme, for providing this advice. 
iii The case of two knot points occurred only in a few cases in the earlier years of our sample. In each 
case the resulting AA yield curve still looked reasonable. 
iv Shea (1985) reports this problem. 
v Adding more knot points will improve the fit of Vasicek and Fong (1982) so if we were to compare 
this model to McCulloch (1975) which uses more knot points, it may not perform as well. So we added 
a fourth knot point only to find that there were no differences in the results. Since our purpose is to 
demonstrate and test for the problems inherent in estimating corporate yield curves and not to test for 
the “best” statistical yield curve model, we thought this issue deserved no more attention. 
vi Before 1989, Lehman Brothers used a size cut-off of $25 million, after 1989 the cut-off was $50 
million. 